






Thanatological Pluralism and the Epistemic 
Openness of ‘Death’
Abstract
This article discusses conceptual ambiguities in relation to the current definitions of ‘death’. 
It addresses the need for an essentially pluralistic approach that probes the limits of epis-
temic singularity and perceives death as an open concept. Despite the views dependent 
upon the irrevocable termination of existence, I assume the opposite: first, that there are 
manifold ways to respond philosophically to the issue, without giving priority to any sov-
ereign or prescribed position; second, that the plurality of unequally convincing positions 
opens up the ‘democratic’ space of negotiations about life and death as a political space par	
excellence, privileged by philosophy. Finally, my thesis about the thanatological pluralism 
gets closer to what I shall call the ‘political philosophy of death’ in the future studies of the 












istence	which,	 in	 turn,	makes	 the	 concept	 of	 death	 not	 only	 definable	 but	
also	conceived	as	a	totality	that	remains	essentially	closed.	On	which	other	
grounds	do	we	understand	death	as	a	‘closed’	concept?

















temic	singularity	and	 its	 sovereignty	on	numerous	 levels,	most	notably	via	
the	understanding	of	death	as	an	open	concept.	My	main	argument	revolves	
around	the	need	to	break	away	from	the	‘radical	break’	between	our	ideas	of	
existence	and	death	 in	order	 to	 re-politicize	 the	 issue	 from	pluriversal	 (not	
‘universal’)	perspectives	which	take	into	account	political	and	ethical	incon-




argue	 that	 the	 epistemic	 horizons	 of	 contemporary	 thanatological	 thinking	
should	not	be	limited	by	the	idea	of	life’s	irrevocable	termination	at	the	end-
point	 of	 existence	 as	 a	 given;	 instead,	 they	 should	 be	 encountered	 from	 a	
broader	viewpoint	–	or	the	multitude	of	viewpoints	–	allowing	for	the	open	





men	killed	 a	 dozen	of	 people	 at	 the	 offices	 of	 the	French	 satirical	weekly	













































































Attack	 and	 “how	 the	West	 treats	 Muslims”	
see	 the	 online	 edition	 of	 Democracy Now!	













































































































tential)	 ‘evil’	 side	 of	 existence	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 takes	 away	 life	 –	 or	








Bernard	 N.	 Schumacher,	 for	 example,	 goes	
against	 life’s	 deduction	 to	 an	 end-point.	 He	
defends	 the	 thesis	on	death’s	 freedom	 to	 re-
main	open	 rather	 than	“connected	with	a	 fi-
nite	temporality”	when	he	argues	that	“human	
life	 is	not	perceived	as	a	closed	 totality”.	 In	





















2. The ambiguity of ‘partial existence’




end-point	of	 existence	as	 an	 indispensable	 condition	 for	 a	human	being	 to	
die.	This	complies	with	what	contemporary	bioethical	theorists	have	in	mind	










the	ambiguity	of	death	itself	but the ambiguity of our concept of death	which	
leads	to	conflicts	between	the	various	ways	we	approach	the	issue.	Several	




decades	 in	our	policy	on	death	 […]	 largely	due	 to	 improvements	 in	health	
technologies”	(Holland	2003:	70).	With	 the	appearance	of	 life-support	ma-
chines,	the	earlier	criteria	for	death	(heart	and	lungs-related	diagnosis	centred	














“capacity	 for	 consciousness”	 is	 permanently	 ruined).	This	 is	 important,	 he	
continues,	because	“getting	the	right	account	of	death	might	inform	life-end-
ing	judgments”	(Holland	2003:	74),	but	especially	because	it	concerns	the	so-









































3. The ‘nonsense’ of death
So	 far	we	have	 seen	 that	 the	meditations	on	death	 can	undergo	more	 than	
one	singular	method	 (un)related	 to	 the	so-called	 radical	break	 formula:	 for	













Fear,”	in	The Cambridge Companion to Epi-
cureanism,	 James	 Warren	 (ed.),	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	Cambridge	2009,	pp.	242–
243.	See	also:	James	Warren,	Facing Death. 










































































Here	we	must	come	 to	 terms	with	our	own	position	 towards	 the	presumed	
nothingness	 of	 death.	 ‘To	 us’,	who	 are	 still	 living,	 death	might	 still	mean	
nothing.	Nonetheless,	when	I	 refer	 to us,	 this	stands	 for	 those	who	are	not	
only	living	but	also	–	and	consciously	–	dying	human	beings,	including	those	
who	are	now	absent	(as	they	are	already	dead).	The	latter	concerns,	in	par-
ticular,	the one among us	(namely,	Epicurus	himself)	to	whom	the	sentences	
in	the	earlier	quote	have	been	applied,	according	to	the	Letter to Menoeceus.8	
Though	 pronounced	 and	written	 during	 his	 own	 lifetime,	 Epicurus’	words	
have	 remained	 to	buzz	 till	 the	present	as	 if	he	was	 still	 alive	–	 though	we	
know	he	is	not.	Hence,	if	‘death	is	nothing	to	us’	then	the	death	of	the	one	
who	said	so	(more	than	two	thousand	years	ago)	should	also	be	treated	as	part	















ing.	 Whether	 this	 has	 been	 a	 programmatic	
and	strategic	choice	imposed	by	the	epistemic	
sovereignty	centered	on	life,	remains	an	open	















name	 of	 life,	 the	 ‘mass	 grave’	 has	 become	




For	 the	 Epicurean	 dictum	 on	 death	 and	
its	 most	 recent	 critical	 revision	 see	 B.	
Schumacher,	Death and Mortality in Contem-
porary Philosophy,	 pp.	 151–167;	 168–181.	
Also:	James	Warren,	Facing Death. Epicurus 
and His Critics	 (Oxford	 University	 Press,	
Oxford	 2004).	 For	 English	 translations	 of	
Epicurus’s	Letter to Menoeceus	 see,	 for	 ex-
ample,	 Epicurus,	 The Epicurus Reader. Se-
lected Writings and Testimonia,	Brad	Inwood	
(ed.),	Brad	Inwood	and	L.	P.	Gerson	(trans.),	
Hackett,	 Indianapolis	 and	 Cambridge	 1994;	











































are	dying	creatures.	Let	us	also	assume	 that	 this	position	of	our	 ‘universal	
equality’	is	unquestionable.
Yet,	we	know	that	we	are	not	all	equal	in	life	even	if	our	‘universal	equality’	




















do	not	want	 ‘to	give	 their	 lives	away,’	 so	 to	 say,	or	 those	who	understand	
death	 in	negative	 terms.	On	 the	other	hand,	 there	are	 those	who	 fear	 their	
own	death	less,	or	do	not	fear	it	at	all:	those	who	do	not	mind	giving	their	
lives	away,	so	to	say,	or	those	who	prefer	‘taking	their	own	lives’	(those	who	
are	 prone	 to	 commit	 suicide	 or	 to	 sacrifice	 their	 lives	 for	 a	 certain	 cause,	






















For	 any	discussion	 that	 is	 expectedly	or	 unexpectedly	 irresolvable,	 ‘death’	
represents	one	of	the	most	pertinent	subjects:	it	imposes	the	ultimate	frontier	
to	 knowledge.	However,	 the	 essential	 ignorance	 regarding	 our	 own	deaths	
allows	us	to	argue	differently	over	the	subject	of	death:	thanks	to	this	differ-






































to	 question	 the	 humankind’s	 inequality	 at	 large.	Additionally,	 it	means	 to	















from	a	borderline	epistemic	position.	The	 readers	are	 thus	urged	 to	ques-
tion	their	basic	assumptions	on	life	and	death	dichotomy,	particularly	with	





















necropolitcs	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	 powerful)	 and	 the	 joyless	 existence	 of	 the	
powerless,	the	“living	dead”.	This	is	the	central	tenet	of	my	article:	to	invite	
the	 living	human	beings,	once	again,	 to	 re-consider	 their	own	humanness 
beyond	the	East/West	and	South/North	divisions	of	power;	to	negotiate	the	
politics	of	life	by	questioning	some	old	and,	also,	by	opening	some	novel	
horizons	 about	 death,	 with	 some	 better,	 future,	 and	 pluriversal	 epistemic	
communities	in	mind.
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Tema ovoga teksta konceptualne su nedoumice u vezi s postojećim definicijama fenomena smrti. 
Autor preusmjerava pozornost na potrebu uspostave bitno pluralističkoga pristupa kojime se 
propituju granice epistemološke singularnosti (zatvorenosti) ne bi li se smrt predstavila kroz 
otvoreniji spoznajni koncept. Unatoč stajališta ovisnih o smrti kao neopozivu prestanku po-
stojanja, ovdje se pretpostavlja suprotno: prvo, da postoje raznovrsni načini kojima se na pi-
tanje smrti može odgovoriti filozofski, ne dajući prednost bilo kojoj suverenoj (superiornoj) i 
unaprijed propisanoj poziciji; drugo, da pluralitet nejednako uvjerljivih pozicija o fenomenu 
smrti otvara »demokratski« prostor pregovora – o pitanjima kako života tako i smrti – kojega 
filozofija privilegira (ili bi trebala privilegirati) kao politički prostor par	excellence. Na kraju, 
autorova se teza o tanatološkom pluralizmu približava onome što bi se u budućim istraživanji-








Thanatologischer Pluralismus und die epistemologische 
Offenheit des „Todes“
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel behandelt konzeptuelle Mehrdeutigkeiten in Bezug auf die kursierenden Defi-
nitionen des „Todes“. Er geht das Bedürfnis nach einem grundsätzlich pluralistischen Ansatz 
an, wodurch Grenzen der epistemologischen Singularität erforscht werden, und perzipiert den 
Tod als ein offenes Konzept. Trotz der Ansichten, die von der unwiderruflichen Beendigung 
der Existenz abhängig sind, nehme ich das Gegenteil an: erstens, dass es vielfältige Wege gibt, 
philosophisch auf die Frage zu antworten, ohne irgendeiner souveränen oder vorgeschriebenen 
Position Vorrang zu geben; zweitens, dass die Pluralität von ungleichmäßig überzeugenden 
Positionen „demokratischen“ Raum für Verhandlungen eröffnet – über Leben und Tod als po-
litischen Raum par	excellence – der von der Philosophie privilegiert wird. Schließlich nähert 
sich meine These über den thanatologischen Pluralismus dem, was ich in zukünftigen, hier 





Le pluralisme thanatologique et l’ouverture épistémique de la « mort »
Résumé
Cet article décrit les ambiguïtés conceptuelles en relation avec les définitions actuelles de la « 
mort ». Il répond au besoin d’une approche essentiellement pluraliste qui sonde les limites de la 
singularité épistémique et perçoit la mort comme un concept ouvert. Malgré les points de vues 
dépendantes de la conception de mort conçue comme la cessation irrévocable de l’existence, 
je suppose le contraire: d’abord, qu’il y a de multiples façons philosophiques de répondre à la 
question de la mort, sans accorder la priorité à une position souveraine ou prescrite ; deuxième-
ment, que la pluralité de positions inégalement convaincantes ouvre un espace « démocratique 
», c’est à dire : l’espace des négociations sur la vie et la mort comme un espace politique par 
excellence, en même temps privilégié par la philosophie. Enfin, ma thèse sur le pluralisme tha-
natologique se rapproche de ce que j’appellerai la « philosophie politique de la mort » dans les 
futures études de la question, ici insuffisamment explorée.
Mots-clés
mort,	connaissance,	philosophie	thanatologique,	souveraineté	épistémique,	pluralisme,	politique
